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Summary 
 
As the UK enters the third year of the credit crunch and passes through a fourth quarter of negative 
economic growth, it is an appropriate time to identify risks arsing from the financial structure of UK 
agriculture.  The starting point is the work of Harrison and Tranter (1989).  They identified seven 
sources of growing risk from the changing financial structure of UK agriculture leading up to 1986.  
These sources of risk are updated to identify those that remain.  Additional emerging sources of risk 
are then identified using Hudson‟s (1986) causes of bankruptcy (negative equity, inadequate cash 
flow and uncertain future profitability), and the threats related to credit rationing. UK farming 
appears well placed compared to the late 1980s.  It has benefited from its traditional conservative 
attitude to credit. But it remains exposed to (i) exposure of profitability to global markets and cash 
flow risk and downward readjustment in asset prices, (ii) a higher dependency on government 
subsidies and the increasing transparency of these subsidies. (iii) a higher exposure to exchange 
rate risk, (iv) counterparty risk, (v) increased protectionism, (iv) exposure of diversified income 
streams and off-farm employment to the economic recession, and (vii) fiscal policy as the UK and 
other governments around the globe seek to rebalance their deficits by revising taxation and 
spending plans. The impacts of these exposures will only become known after the full effects of all 
stimulus packages and support from governments around the world have worked their way 
through the global economy.  As the UK government seeks to balance its fiscal position, there is a 
danger that the relative financial stability of agriculture may make it a target for a combination of 
tax increases and spending cuts.  If so, this would reduce the profitability of farming, which would 
have knock-on effects including reduced farmland asset values, and an increased difficulty in 
servicing interest repayment. 
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Introduction 
 
Risk - the estimated measure or probability of some event happening - and uncertainty - knowing 
nothing about the likelihood of possible outcomes - occur because nothing about the future is 
certain (Pannel et al., 2000, p. 69).  Both are expected when working with natural, unpredictable, 
biological systems, and this makes farming a high risk and uncertain business (Willcok et al., 1999; 
Nguyen et al., 2005).  Yet despite high risk and uncertainty, farm managers need to take decisions; 
so coping whilst basing actions on insufficient information is commonplace.  An appreciation of this 
is critical to understanding farm-management decisions because each decision is part of a 
sequence that creates the future, and it is the accumulated effect of repeated choices which may 
have the most significant impact on overall business performance (Hardaker et al., 2004).  
Agricultural business managers therefore need to identify current sources of risk, how these sources 
have changed over time (to identify which are increasing and which decreasing in importance), 
and to evaluate how these changes might affect their coping strategies. 
 
Several studies of the financial structure of UK farming were published in the late 1980s and early 
1990s reflecting the downturn in the sector‟s fortunes at that time (Johnson 1986; Harrison and 
Tranter, 1989; Johnson, 1990; Harrison and Tranter, 1994; Harrison and Tranter, 1995).  It is appropriate 
to return to this area as the UK enters the third year of the credit crunch1 and with UK GDP having 
contracted by 0.1%, 0.6% and 1.8% in the second, third and fourth quarters of 2008 respectively, 
and by 2.4%, 0.6% and 0.4% in the first three quarter of 2009,2 and with the European Commission 
forecasts of a further decline of 3.8% in 2009.  As “the UK economy is now clearly experiencing one 
of its worst recession in recent history” (Fildes, 2009), and with most of the slowdown in economic 
activity occurring in the last quarter of 2008 and first quarter of 2009, the bulk of the setback in 
production will be reflected in the statistics for 2009 (UNCTAD, 2009, p. 4), in which year UNCTAD 
predicts a 2.7% fall in global GDP. 
 
The collapse of credit supply and financial asset prices in September 2008 exacerbated the 
economic slump.  Commercial banks had to be recapitalised, not only because they were 
suffering losses from non-performing loans, but also because the remaining assets suddenly 
became more risky, requiring higher capital coverage.  Banks sought to strengthen their balance 
sheets by selling toxic assets to government supported programmes or writing them off, by reducing 
lending and foreclosing on short-term, unsecured loans and recapitalising from current profits, in 
part by failing to pass on low central bank interest rates and in part by increasing the fees charged 
to customers.  This cutback in the provision of credit immediately translated credit risk into liquidity 
                                                 
1 The credit crunch is considered by many to have begun on 9th of August 2007 - the day the European 
Central Bank and the US Federal Reserve injected $90 billion (£45 billion) into financial markets (Elliott, 2008). 
2 The widely accepted definition of a recession is two consecutive quarters of negative growth in GDP. 
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risk: many of those businesses which relied on short-term credit were forced to consider selling part 
of their assets in order to meet their short-term liabilities.  As a consequence, the reduced credit 
supply exerted additional downward pressure on some asset prices, causing a further deterioration 
in the solvency of borrowers and additional loan foreclosures. 
 
The unprecedented stimulus packages, monetary policy easing and support for ailing financial 
institutions introduced by governments across the globe appear to have stabilised financial 
markets, but have been insufficient to revive demand and halt rising unemployment (Marshall 
2009).  Such support measures increased the UK Government‟s net debt by over £100 billion in 2008-
09 to £800.8 billion, equivalent to 56.8% of gross domestic product (ONS, 2009).3  It is currently 
projecting a 1.1% a year real growth in public spending (IFS, 2009) with annual net borrowing 
projected to peak at £118 billion in 2009-10.  The public sector net debt is forecast to keep 
increasing as a share of national income until 2015-16 whilst budget deficit is halved in the four 
years from 2010/11 (HM Treasury, 2009).  One implication of this is that a business can plan for a 
combination of tax increases and spending cuts, another is that public sector net debt interest 
payments will grow as a percentage of national income to 2.4%.  Subtracting this from the 1.1% real 
growth in total expenditure leaves only a 0.7% average annual real growth for all other areas of 
spending (IFS 2009: p 180).  To an extent some of government‟s other expenditure commitments, for 
example benefit expenditure, can also be calculated and deducted from the 1.1% real overall 
growth.  When this is done, departmental expenditure would have to remain frozen in real terms 
between 2010-11 and 2013-14 (IFS, 2009, p. 182). 
 
“These implied spending plans are so tight that all major spending departments are likely to be 
affected” (IFS 2009 p 182).  Under the existing Spending Review, the Department of Environment, 
Food and Rural Development (DEFRA) received a real cut in spending of about 1.8%.  If there is no 
real growth in total department expenditures and assuming the pain is shared equally, it is 
estimated that DEFRA would experience a 4% real cut in its departmental expenditure limit (IFS 
2009: p 182-183).  These forecasts of revenue and expenditure are based on the UK economy 
growing by 1.25% in 2010 (HM Treasury, 2009, p. 18), which itself is based on “the assumption that 
G20 authorities deliver on policy commitments and that financial conditions ease as a result” (p. 
181); though not all commentators believe the policy responses put in place will be successful.  For 
example, Stiglitz (2009), the 2001 Nobel prize winner in economics, believes that “our collective 
response has been mistaken and inadequate – that we may just have made matters worse”, and 
the IMF (2008) World Economic Outlook report argues that episodes of financial turmoil 
characterized by banking sector distress are more likely to be associated with severe and 
                                                 
3 These data include the costs of interventions in the financial sector.  It is likely that some proportion of these 
costs will be recovered if the government sells its stake.  If these costs are excluded, net debt is £658.1 billion, 
46.6% of GDP. 
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protracted downturns than episodes of stress centred mainly in securities or foreign exchange 
markets (IMF, 2008, p. 129) 
 
These financial developments and uncertainties in the global and UK economies make this an 
appropriate time to once again consider the resilience of UK agriculture from the perspective of its 
financial structure.  The paper is structured as follows.  As any impacts will vary with the conditions in 
place at the start of the financial crisis, which includes the state of the sector‟s balance sheets and 
the dynamics of the credit and asset prices in the run-up to that crisis, the starting point is an 
evaluation of Harrison and Tranter‟s „seven sources of growing risk in UK agriculture‟, which are listed 
and classified by risk category.  In section three the data from which these sources of risk have 
been identified are updated, in as far as it is possible to do so, to assess any threats they pose to UK 
farming today.  Section four identifies emerging sources of risk by comparing UK agriculture‟s 
financial structure and future prospects with Hudson‟s (1986) principle causes of bankruptcy; 
negative equity, inadequate cash flow and uncertain future profitability.  Section five discusses the 
potential impacts on UK agriculture of the global and national macro-economic circumstances.  A 
conclusion completes the paper. 
 
Harrison and Tranter‟s (1989) Seven Source of Growing Risk 
 
This paper takes as its starting point the authoritative study of the impact of the changing financial 
structure of UK farming on emerging sources of risk by Harrison and Tranter (1989).  Drawing on a 
wide range of financial trends up to 1986, they concluded “risk in farming has increased, in recent 
years, in at least seven distinct and important ways” (p. 61), namely: 
 Interest rate increases, an increase in overall debt in total, especially to variable interest rate 
sources, and because interest rates are now much higher in real terms (that is after allowing 
for changes in the retail price index (RPI)); 
 Withdrawal of Financial Institutions from the land market as purchasers, reducing farmers‟ 
opportunities to sell land and lease it back in order to rid themselves of excessively heavy 
debt service burdens; 
 Based on large scale survey work, in the early 1970s, a diminishing of within-the-family funding 
sources as members of the farming family who had been left farm assets demanded their 
shares be paid in cash, increasing the splitting-up of farms on the death of the owner; 
 The increased dependency of the industry on purchased inputs from the rest of the economy 
and therefore subject to additional price risks on that account and because farmers are 
increasingly unable to substitute low-cost family labour inputs for them; 
 Continuing deterioration in the sector‟s terms of trade, with inputs costing more and products 
commanding lower prices; 
 5 
 Increased variability of farm product prices compared to what they were 8 to 10 years 
previously; and 
 Based on farm survey data, the increased year-to-year variation in farm income between 
1981-85 compared with the period between 1976 and 1980. 
 
These emerging risks can be classified into the following categories of risk identified in the literature 
(Miller et al., 2004); financial risk (interest rate changes and levels of debt, and changing sources of 
finance); institutional risk (changes to the land market); societal risk (changes in family aims, goals 
and norms); business risk, comprising market price risk (increased dependency on inputs, 
deterioration of sector‟s terms of trade, and increased variability of farm product prices and farm 
incomes) and production risk (reduction of low-cost family labour and increased variability of farm 
incomes); and macro-economic policy (such as interest rates, inflation, etc.).  There are, therefore, 
some types of risk that they did not consider particularly altered from their long-term trend, such as 
those posed by animal diseases, uncertain availability of inputs, counterparty risk (the risk that 
trading partners might declare for bankruptcy), technological risk due to technological 
obsolescence, agriculture sector specific risks, exchange rate risk and environmental risks.  The 
following section updates these seven sources of risk in so far as it is possible to do so, given the 
change in the way data is collected, collated and reported, and the absence of farm survey data.  
This is followed by an analysis of emerging sources of growing risk. 
 
Updating Harrison and Tranter‟s Growing Sources or Risk in UK Agriculture 
 
This section examines how Harrison and Tranter‟s (1989) seven distinct and growing sources of risk 
have evolved since the mid-1980s in as far as it is possible to do so.  It concludes by summarising the 
extent to which they remain a threat to UK agriculture today. 
 
High interest rates, with a more than proportionate growth in exposure to variable interest rates 
Figure 1 and Table 1 show the change in the proportion of liabilities in farming held as bank 
overdraft and the trend in real interest rates respectively.  The increasing proportion of loans held as 
bank overdrafts, which is more risky than long-term loans because they are subject to variable 
rather than fixed interest rates and foreclosure at short notice, up to 1986 is shown.  Since then this 
proportion has fallen to 28% by 2007 as farmers rebalanced their debt structure.  Although there has 
been a 22% reduction, because total liabilities have increased the value of loans held as bank 
overdrafts has reduced by only 15% (£543 million), a reduction from £3.56 billion to £3.06 billion.  This 
still represents a considerable sum of short-term, unsecured borrowing given the current overdraft 
freeze and suggests that UK agriculture would be badly affected should banks foreclose on these 
loans. 
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Figure 1 Trends in bank overdrafts and real interest rate 
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Source: Table 9.3 Aggregate balance sheets for agriculture: United Kingdom, and Table 9.6 Interest; 
United Kingdom, both in Agriculture in the UK (DEFRA, 2009b) 
 
 
Table 1.  Average rate of interest and real rate of interest on bank advances to agriculture 
 
Year Annual 
average 
interest rate on 
bank advances 
to agriculture 
Real interest 
rate 
Year Annual 
average 
interest rate 
on bank 
advances to 
agriculture 
Real interest rate 
1973 12.1 2.9 1995 9.3 5.8 
1975 12.7 -11.5 2000 8.2 5.2 
1980 18.6 0.6 2005 6.7 3.9 
1985 14.8 8.7 2007 7.6 3.3 
1990 17.3 7.8    
 
Source: Table 9.6 Interest; United Kingdom.  Agriculture in the UK (DEFRA, 2009b) 
 
Nominal interest rates continued to rise through 1986 until 1990, by which time real interest rates had 
started to fall.  Monetary policy gradually brought inflation more under control and declining real 
and nominal interest rates relaxed interest rate pressure.  By 2007 the nominal and real cost of 
borrowing, at 7.6 and 3.3% respectfully, represent a long-term low, reducing the debt burden on 
businesses, whilst still delivering a real return on savers‟ bank deposits. 
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These low interest rates stimulated an increase in total borrowing (Figure 2).  Total loans advanced 
to UK farming increased sharply up to 1985 and continued to rise thereafter but at a slower rate 
until the mid 2000s.  In 2007 liabilities reached £11.1 billion, an increase of £4,026 billion (57%) over 
the 1986 level.  However, total farm asset values had also increased.  In 1986, the value of assets 
held by UK farming had remained at about the same level for 7 years, and they had returned to 
this level by 1992, when leverage, the ratio of total debt to total assets, peaked at 14.5%.  
Thereafter, asset values increased faster than liabilities, and leverage fell.  By 2007 total liabilities 
comprised 5.85% of assets which were provisionally estimated to be worth £190 billion.  This suggests 
that agriculture has entered this turmoil from a relatively strong position, and its relatively strong 
balance sheet offers some protection against a sharp downturn. 
 
However, much of the increase in asset values arose from the growth in farmland values.  In the 
decade leading to 2008, the change in net stock of capital assets fell by £2,371 billion.  This reflects 
a period of low profitability when depreciation (a positive cash flow item) was used to meet living 
expenses rather than reinvested in new equipment and buildings.  This trend was reversed in 2007 
and 2008, when profits recovered due to the commodity price boom: in 2008 net stock of capital 
assets increased by £466 million as farmers replaced worn out equipment and dilapidated 
buildings.4 
 
Withdrawal of institutions from land purchase, reducing farmers’ opportunities to sell and lease 
back land 
Harrison and Tranter (1989) identified “the virtual complete withdrawal of the Financial Institutions 
from the land market as purchasers” as a growing source of risk to UK farming because it reduced 
opportunities “for farmers to sell land and lease it back in order to rid themselves of excessively 
heavy debt service burdens” (p 61).  Figure 3 uses data from DEFRA‟s “Agricultural land prices and 
Sales in England” series which detailed the area purchased and sold by buyer‟s and vendor‟s 
background to show that the decline in the years leading up to 1986 extended to 1989.  Thereafter, 
though the rate of disposal of farmland by financial institutions slowed, they remained net disposers 
every year to 2004, the last year for which this data series is reported, when financial institutions 
purchased only 67 and sold only 811 ha of land.5 
                                                 
4 In the decade leading up to 1986 net stock of capital increased by £524 million, though in 1986 itself net 
stock decreased by £337 million (all current prices). 
5 This data was collected by the Valuation Office Agency (VOA) and reported by DEFRA. 
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Figure 2 Trends in total assets and total liabilities in UK farming, and leverage. 
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Source: Table 9.3 Aggregate balance sheets for agriculture: United Kingdom; Agriculture in the UK 
(DEFRA, 2009b) 
 
Figure 3 Net purchases of land (ha) by „Property Companies and Financial Institutions‟ (1980-1992) 
and by Financial Institutions (1993-2004) 
-14,000
-12,000
-10,000
-8,000
-6,000
-4,000
-2,000
0
2,000
4,000
6,000
8,000
10,000
12,000
14,000
16,000
1980 1983 1986 1989 1992 1995 1998 2001 2004
Year
N
e
t 
p
u
rc
h
a
s
e
s
 o
f 
la
n
d
 (
h
a
)
Property Companies and Financial Institutions: net purchases (ha)
Financial Institutions: net purchases (ha)
 
Source: Agricultural Land Sales and Prices in England, (DEFRA, 2006), and Royal Institute of 
Chartered Surveyors (RICS, various) 
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Data after 2004 are available from the Royal Institute of Chartered Surveyors (RICS).6  Harrison and 
Tranter noted that “individuals, as distinct from institutions, have long dominated the land market in 
the sense of being statistically the most numerous principals” (1989, p. 61), and this remains so 
today.7  In 2003 and 2004 „Non-farmer Individual Buyers‟ roughly equalled the number of „Farmer 
Individual Buyers‟ at 43-44% each.  By 2007 the single largest purchasers of farmland was „Individual 
Farmers‟, their share of all buyers in the second half of 2007, both halves of 2008 and the first half of 
2009 was 50%, 56%, 60% and 62% respectively.   
 
The reduction in demand for farmland from life-style buyers as the credit crunch deepened, 
resulting in redundancies and reduced bonuses, shows that farmland prices were increasingly 
established by working farmers.  Land prices jumped by an average of 24%, from £10,439 to 
£12,965, in the first half of 2008 following the sharp increase in commodity prices (RICS, Jan-June 
2008) and a continued willingness of banks to lend to agriculture (RICS, July-Dec 2008).  However, 
there is now a “widespread perception among surveyors that growth in farmland prices is likely to 
have reached its peak in H1 [i.e. the first half of] 2008” (RICS, July-Dec 2008, p. 1), as non-farmer 
and foreign demand for rural properties and farmland declined still further in the early months of 
2009 (RICS, Jan-June 2009). 
 
Land has traditionally been seen by Financial Investors as a safe haven for their investments: 
whether they are likely to return to investing in farmland is likely to depend to some extent at least, 
on the success of the international response to the credit crisis, much of which has yet to be 
delivered (HM Treasury, 2009, p. 18). 
 
Diminishing of within-the-family funding sources increases the splitting-up of farms on the death of 
the owner. 
Harrison and Tranter drew upon evidence from a large-scale survey of farms, confirmed by bank 
managers, to report that “the years of rapidly rising land values – and of prices generally – caused 
many members of farming families (often brothers and sisters) who had been left farm assets, under 
terms which excluded them from equity participation and therefore capital gains on them, to 
demand that their shares be paid in cash” (Harrison and Tranter. 1989, p. 61-63).  One result of this 
was that “farmers‟ debt levels are higher than they would otherwise have been” having “been 
compelled to borrow from higher cost sources than the low-cost, within-family ones they enjoyed in 
earlier years, when family ties were stronger and less influenced by narrowly commercial 
considerations” (p. 63).  The absence of a detailed farm survey means this trend cannot be 
                                                 
6 RICS publishes information, initially quarterly but since the second half of 2006 biannually, on land purchasers‟ 
background (RICS various). 
7 Some care must be taken when comparing RICS with DEFRA‟s time series as the RICS data reports purchaser 
background only, and the Great Britain share is estimated by simply averaging the percentage recorded 
across each of 10 regions. 
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updated.  However, there is no reason to believe that motivations of family members who have 
been left farm assets have changed, and as asset values have increased more rapidly recently 
than in the early 1980s (Figure 2), these incentives to extract equity most likely remain, and indeed 
to have increased in recent years.  However, easy access to cheap loans characteristic of the 
2000s would have decreased the costs to the continuing farmer of paying out family members thus 
decreasing the impact of this source of risk today. 
 
Increased dependency on purchased inputs increases price risk and reduces the possibilities of 
substituting family labour for purchased inputs. 
Increased dependence on inputs purchased from the rest of the economy makes farming “subject 
to additional price risks, and farmers are increasingly unable to substitute low-cost family labour 
inputs for them - the traditional belt tightening exercise associated with family-farming” (p. 63).  The 
evidence they present to support this increased dependency includes; 
 a shift away from livestock enterprises and towards directly crop-based ones (feed and livestock 
items made up 50% of costs in 1971, 44% in 1985), 
 a move towards mechanical and chemical inputs (machinery, fertilizers, and miscellaneous 
items came to 42% of costs in 1971, 47% in 1985), 
 An increasing proportion of farming gross income was required to meet capital replacement 
and interest charges.8 
 
Figure 4 reproduced these time trends to the extent that it is possible.  The shift away from feed and 
livestock enterprises towards crop based ones has continued since 1986.  A degree of this shift is 
related to animal production risk, for example there was a substantial drop in 1996 when it was 
reported that BSE in farm animals could be transmitted to humans through eating infected meat.  
Since then, other major and costly farm-animal diseases such as Food and Mouth Disease 
(outbreaks in 2001 and 2007) and pig diseases have reduced livestock numbers.9  The reversal of 
this trend in recent years reflects the increase in livestock feed costs as a result of the boom in 
wheat and barley prices.  From Harrison and Tranter‟s perspective, the trend since 1986 suggests an 
increase the sector‟s price risk. 
 
The dependency on mechanical and chemical inputs declined steadily after 1986, rose in the mid 
1990s before falling again to 14.4% in 2007.  The variability is connected to changes in agricultural 
policy support payments, the introduction of agri-environment schemes, set-aside (which removed 
                                                 
8  The values quoted by Harrison and Tranter (1989), namely “23% of farm gross income was required to meet 
capital wastage (depreciation) while about a further 10% was required to meet interest charges on borrowing 
excluding land purchase debt” (p 63) could not be reproduced in this analysis.  Their text does not provide 
sufficient references for the sources of data used, and the collection, definition and reporting of data has most 
likely changed since their analysis. 
9 Particularly porcine postweaning multisystemic wasting syndrome (PMWS) and porcine reproductive and 
respiratory syndrome (PRRS). 
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a variable percentages of arable land from production each year between 1995 and 2007), and 
will have been influenced to some extent by the growth in registered organic farmers.  Figure 4 also 
shows the trend in depreciation and net interest payments as a percentage of gross income 
(defined as the total value of crop and livestock, and all support payments).  These continued to 
increase after 1986 to peak at 21.9% in 1990, the year when net interest payment was at its highest.  
This series shows some volatility as market output value, support payments and interest repayments 
varied, but have declined steadily since 2005 to 15.9% in 2007.  That both these ratios have fallen 
since 1986 suggests a reduction in the sector‟s risks related to its dependency on inputs purchased 
from the rest of the economy. 
 
Figure 4.  Feed and livestock items as a percentage of total costs, machinery, pesticides and 
fertilizer as a percentage of total costs and depreciation as a percentage of Total Income from 
Farming 
10
13
16
19
22
25
28
31
34
37
1971 1974 1977 1980 1983 1986 1989 1992 1995 1998 2001 2004 2007 2010
Year
P
er
ce
n
ta
g
e
Feed and livestock items as a % of total costs
Machinery, pesticides and fertilizer as % of total costs
Total consumption of fixed costs (depreciation) and net interest paid as a % of gross
income  
Source: Index of the purchase price of the means of agricultural production (United Kingdom), and 
Index of the producers price of agricultural products; (United Kingdom) Agriculture in the UK 
(DEFRA, 2009b) 
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Of particular concern to Harrison and Tranter was farmers‟ increasing inability to substitute low-cost 
family labour inputs for waged employment, one of the “traditional belt tightening exercise 
associated with family-farming” (Harrison and Tranter, 1989, p. 63).  Figure 5 shows the reduction in 
both family and employed labour in farming has continued after 1986.  As the proportion of the 
workforce with an equity interest in farming increases and wage employment falls, so the ability to 
substitute between family and waged labour reduces still further.  However, this also means that a 
larger proportion of the wage bill is paid to people who might more willingly forego a proportion of 
their salary, at least in the short-term.  This increase in flexibility reduces liquidity risk and allows 
farmers to continue to farm for longer when profitability is low. 
 
Figure 5.  The reduction in labour use, highlighting the fall in paid labour 
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Source: Table 3.8 Labour force in agriculture, United Kingdom, Agriculture in the UK (DEFRA, 2009b). 
 
The continuing deterioration in the sector’s terms of trade 
Harrison and Tranter (1989) note that in the years leading up to 1986 “inputs are costing more and 
products are commanding lower prices” (p. 63), leading to a deterioration in the sector‟s terms of 
trade.  Table 2 compares the change in input and output prices and the sector‟s terms of trade in 
the four years prior to 1986 and 2008.  The earlier period recorded a decline in the terms of trade by 
8.5 points as input prices increased faster than output prices to squeeze farm profitability.  This 
compares with the 0.2% change in the four year period leading to 2007, suggesting no cost-price 
squeeze.  However, during this time input prices increased by 48% and output prices by 46%, these 
substantial movements suggest the timing of input purchases and sale of product has become 
more critical pressurising farmers with limited working capital; farmers with access to savings or 
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credit can benefit by buying inputs before selling outputs if they believe that to be the most 
beneficial trading strategy. 
 
Table 2.  Comparison of input and output indices and terms of trade 1982-1985 and 2005-2008 
 
 Change 
in input 
index 
Change in 
output 
index 
Change in 
terms of 
trade 
Standard 
deviation 
Mean CV 
1982-1985 15 4 -8.5 3.81 97.8 3.89 
2005-2008 48.1 46.2 0.2 1.58 96.3 1.64 
 
Source: Index of the purchase price of the means of agricultural production (United Kingdom), 
and Index of the producers price of agricultural products; (United Kingdom) Agriculture in the UK 
(DEFRA, 2009b). 
 
Increase variability of farm product prices 
A comparison of the coefficient of variation (standard deviation divided by mean price) of 13 items 
in each of the two three year periods, 1976-78 and 1984-86, allowed Harrison and Tranter (1989) to 
conclude “farm product prices are more volatile than they were 8 to 10 years ago” (p. 63).  Their 
analysis revealed that “only 3 product groups (fresh fruit, flowers and plants, and eggs) had a 
narrower spread of prices in the later period than the earlier” (p. 63-64).  However, they found that 
“quite the opposite appears to have occurred on the factor side” (p. 64), with only energy, 
fertilisers and seed showing more variable price movements between 1984 and 1986 than between 
1978 and 1980.  With higher variability in product prices but lower variability of factors, Harrison and 
Tranter concluded that “the evidence relating to price variability is not clear cut” (p. 64). 
 
Table 3 reproduces their analysis, comparing the coefficient of variation for product and factor 
input prices between two periods, the 2001 to 2004 and 2005 to 2008.  Nine of eleven product 
prices have an increased coefficient of variation, with the index of “total of all products” increasing 
from 3.8 to 16.3.  Seventeen of the nineteen factor input prices have an increased coefficient of 
variation, with the index of “all means of agricultural production” increasing from 4 to 16.3.  
Fertilizers, animal feeding stuffs and „energy and lubricants‟ reported the largest volatility in the 
most recent period, all inputs for which substitutes are not readily available. 
 
So the nature of risk related to terms of trade appears to have changed.  Farmers have passed on 
some of the benefit of higher commodity prices to input suppliers, and though they have avoided 
the price squeeze of the 1980s, they face significant risks related to asymmetric price adjustments: 
should output prices fall whilst input prices remain high, the sector may experience a sudden and 
extreme adverse shift in its terms of trade. 
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Table 3.  Change in coefficient of variation of agricultural product prices and factor inputs (between 2001-2004 and 2005-2008) 
Agricultural products 
 
Total of 
all 
products Crop products Cereals 
Potatoes for 
Consumption 
Animals & 
animal 
products 
Animals (for 
slaughter and 
export) Cattle Pigs Sheep All Poultry Milk Eggs 
CV (2001-2004) 3.84 4.23 7.58 20.24 3.79 4.61 5.05 4.79 12.04 1.67 4.94 12.55 
CV (2005-2008) 16.31 18.90 34.27 18.27 15.01 13.61 15.84 9.56 10.15 16.04 17.55 16.53 
Change in CV 12.47 14.67 26.70 -1.97 11.23 9.00 10.78 4.78 -1.89 14.37 12.62 3.99 
             
Factor inputs 
 
All means of 
agricultural 
production 
Goods and 
services 
currently 
consumed Seeds 
Energy and 
lubricants 
Fertilisers and 
soil improvers 
Straight 
Nitrogen¹ 
Triple Super 
Phosphate Potassic 
Compound 
Fertiliser Other Fertiliser 
CV (2001-2004) 4.04 4.29 3.97 7.01 7.15 8.89 5.86 4.55 6.00 1.57 
CV (2005-2008) 16.33 17.87 18.48 21.53 53.73 42.30 75.37 71.44 65.51 6.04 
Change in CV 12.29 13.58 14.52 14.52 46.57 33.41 69.51 66.89 59.51 4.47 
 
Plant 
protection 
products 
Animal 
feeding-stuffs 
Maintenanc
e and repair 
of plant 
Maintenanc
e and repair 
of buildings 
Veterinary 
services 
 Other 
Goods & 
Services 
(General 
expenses) 
Goods & 
services 
contributing 
to 
investment 
Machinery 
and other 
equipment Buildings 
Engineering & 
Soil 
Improvements 
CV (2001-2004) 2.38 3.33 7.00 4.59 3.05 4.66 2.32 0.99 5.73 4.56 
CV (2005-2008) 2.81 23.71 6.40 8.27 3.50 3.60 4.24 6.88 7.95 4.89 
Change in CV 0.43 20.38 -0.60 3.68 0.45 -1.05 1.93 5.89 2.21 0.33 
CV = coefficient of variation (=(standard deviation/mean price)*100) 
 
Source: DEFRA (2009a) Index of producer prices of agricultural products: UK 
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Increased annual volatility of farm incomes 
Harrison and Tranter‟s (1989) conclusion that year-to-year variation in farm incomes had become 
more volatile in the period from 1981 to 85 compared to the period between 1976 and 1980 is 
based on comparing the coefficient of variation of 150 individual farms.  Comparable data is not 
available to examine if this remains the case today.  Table 4 examines a related, but by no means 
identical issue, the change in coefficient of variation of Total Income from Farming and Cash Flow 
measured at the sector level for three periods; between 1982 and 1985, 2001 and 2004, and 2005 
and 2008.  The comparison shows little difference in the coefficient of variation in TIFF between the 
three four year periods, but Cash Flow has a considerably higher coefficient of variation in the most 
recent period.  To a large part this is due to the difficulties experienced in the first year of the Single 
Farm Payment Scheme (2005/06). Many farmers extended their borrowing facilities to tie 
themselves over this period.  Such a strategy, though costly, is possible when credit is plentiful, 
which is not the case today.  This liquidity problem arose directly from changes to agriculture 
specific policies and confronting a similar cash shortfall – from whatever source - would pose 
considerable more problems in today‟s economic climate. 
 
Table 4.  Coefficient of Variation for Total Income from Farming, and Cash Flow 
Total Income from farming  Cash flow  
  
Standard 
dev Mean CV   
Standard 
dev Mean CV 
 
1982-1985 439.02 1,871 23.4612 1981-1985 326.38 1,618 20.1719 
2001-2004 500.64 2,335 21.4453 1973-1985 564.62 3,064 18.4291 
2005-2008 576.21 2,604 22.1320 1995-2007 1202.95 2,277 52.8307 
No. 4 4   No. 4 4   
 
Source: Chart 2.1 Long-term trend in farming incomes in real terms (at 2008 prices), Agriculture 
in the UK (DEFRA, 2009b) 
 
 
Summary and Discussion: Current Financial Status 
 
Table 5 summaries the current status of the risks seven risks to UK agriculture identified by Harrison 
and Tranter in 1989.  Some have reduced.  These include stable and lower interest rates, a smaller 
proportion and sum of liabilities held as bank overdraft, strong growth in asset values, which means 
that although total liabilities have increased, leverage at 5.85% is nearly 10 points less than in 1986 
decreasing this source of financial risk.  The decline in the livestock sector of farming represents a 
reduction in opportunities of farmers to add value to the output of their arable enterprises, but the 
share of purchased chemical and fertilizer inputs to total costs has declined as has total 
consumption of fixed costs as a percentage of gross income.  This reduction in dependence on 
inputs from the rest of the economy indicates a decline in input price risk.  The increase in the 
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proportion of the workforce with an equity share in the farm suggests on the one hand less 
substitution possibilities, but as a larger share of the workforce might be willing to forego a 
proportion of their salary, it also increases flexibility and reduces liquidity risk. 
 
Table 5.  Change in the seven sources of risk identified by Harrison and Tranter (1986) 
 
Source of risk that 
have increased 
Sources of risk that 
have decreased 
Change in the 
nature of the risk 
Risks that have not 
been  compared 
Lower and stable 
interest rates. 
A 57% increase in total 
debt. 
Concern with the 
deterioration of 
terms of trade has 
been replaced by 
the extreme 
volatility of input 
and output prices 
with the risk of 
output prices falling 
before input prices. 
Withdrawal of equity 
by family members  
bequeathed farm 
assets.  However, the 
recent substantial 
increase in the value of 
farm assets suggests 
these motivations may 
have increased since 
1986. 
A reduction in the 
proportion of total 
loans held as bank 
overdraft. 
Although a smaller 
percentage of total 
liabilities, UK farming still 
borrows over £3 billion 
in the form of bank 
overdrafts. 
A fall in sector 
leverage, to about 
5.85% 
A continuing absence 
of financial institutions 
from the land market. 
A reduced 
dependency on 
inputs from the rest 
of the economy 
suggests lower in 
input price risk. 
Any fall in demand for 
farmland and/or 
residential properties 
may reduce farm asset 
values  
Variability in farm 
income calculated at 
the farm level.  
However, comparisons 
of aggregate income 
and cash flow 
measures suggest no 
increase in volatility of 
farm incomes but an 
increase in volatility of 
cash flow. 
An end in the 
decline in term of 
trade for the most 
recent four years, 
removing this as a 
source of cost-price 
squeeze on 
profitability. 
The fall in livestock 
numbers has resulted in 
an increase in 
specialisation among 
farmers, which 
increases their 
exposure to output 
price volatility 
The recent rise in 
input and output 
prices has 
importance 
consequences for 
liquidity risks, with 
access to credit 
and savings key to 
managing 
unpredictable cash 
flow. 
As the proportion of 
workers with an 
equity stake in 
farming increased 
opportunities for 
belt-tightening 
involving delaying 
wage payments 
cover  a larger share 
of labour costs. 
An increase in price risk 
following the rapid 
increase in product 
and input prices and 
their increased 
variable. 
 Further substitution of 
family for employed 
labour is increasingly 
limited. 
  
 Inefficient introduction 
of new policies 
increases policy and 
liquidity risks. 
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Total farm debt has increased by 57% since 1986, whilst lower interest rates have reduced the costs 
of borrowing.  The net effect is a reduction of interest repayments of £137m (from £762 million in 
1986 to £625.2 million in 2008).  This is still a substantial sum, and calls into question the ability to 
service this loan should interest rates increase.  The data also indicate a continuing absence of 
financial institutions in the land market.  Most land purchasers in recent years have been farmers 
(RICS Jan-June 2009), and whilst this suggests valuations are based on farmland‟s contribution to 
expected farm profitability, the reduction in sale-and-lease-back opportunities removes one route 
to restructuring farm debt.  Whilst the terms of trade has ceased to move against farming removing 
this as a source of cost-price squeeze on profits, recent years have seen a steep increase in input 
and output prices, increasing liquidity risk.  In recent months output prices have returned towards 
their long-run means, so if input prices remain high or are slow in adjusting downwards, farming 
might be faced with a sudden decline in its terms of trade.  Any pressure on profitability will reduce 
the sectors debt service possibilities. 
 
Overall, then, the evidence (Table 5) is of an overall reduction in the risks arising from the seven 
indicators identified by Harrison and Tranter.  But the change in the nature of some of the risks 
creates some ambiguity as to the final impact, and this makes a clear cut assessment more 
difficult.  It may therefore be sensible to look to other evidence to compare UK farming‟s current 
financial status to that reviewed by Harrison and Tranter.  In particular, the net capital investment of 
the sector and the reported bankruptcies and insolvencies in agriculture – both issues Harrison and 
Tranter drew attention to in their reports (1989; 1994). 
 
Figure 6 shows the levels of investment and consumption of capital assets in UK agriculture.  In four 
of the five years leading up to 1986, UK agriculture recorded net capital formation, but the trend in 
net capital formation turned down after 1983, with 1986 recording net capital consumption.  Cause 
for concern.  More recently, after ten years of net capital consumption (from 1996 to 2005), UK 
agriculture has recorded three years of net capital formation as farmers us profits to replaced worn 
out capital – a clear indicator of a more profitable trading environment.  It would be expected 
from an inspection of this data, that UK agriculture needed investment for it to continue to retain 
productivity levels of recent years, and the upturn in investment reflects higher levels of profitability 
allowing this need to be serviced, putting UK farming on a stronger footing vis-à-vis 1986. 
 
The number of bankruptcies in agriculture can also be used to reflect the financial status of the 
sector (Franks, 1998).  It has another advantage in being based on individual farm data, rather than 
aggregated sector data which removes critical information about timing (seasonality), location 
(place) and physical attributes (quality); using aggregate data washes out risk characteristics (Just 
2003).  Harrison and Tranter (1989, p. 75) refer to the 238 individual and company insolvencies in 
agriculture in 1986 as being “scarcely an alarming total nationally” as they represented only 1.1% of 
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the total bankruptcies and insolvencies in England and Wales that year.  However, they write “it is a 
matter of concern and significance that the total has almost doubled over the last 5 years”.  Figure 
7 shows the basis of their concerns as bankruptcies and insolvencies in agricultural increased, 
peaking in 1992 at 504 (ONS, various). 
 
Figure 6 Changes in volume of capital assets in agriculture (United Kingdom) 
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Source: Table 9.7 Changes in volume of capital assets; United Kingdom, Agriculture in the UK 
(DEFRA, 2009b) 
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Figure 7. Total UK and agricultural individual bankruptcies and company insolvencies in England 
and Wales 
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Source: various statistics releases (The Insolvency Service, 2009) 
 
The high correlation between agriculture and total insolvencies (0.927) in the years from 1980 to 
1986 suggests similar underlying causes as the UK economy entered the recession of the late 
1980s.10  In 1986 therefore, both the level and rate if increase in bankruptcies in the agricultural 
sector were valid indicators of current and future financial stress; in turned out that the level of 
bankruptcies was a good leading indicator of future financial stress at that time.  But does this 
remain the case?  Between 2000 and 2004 the correlation coefficient between total UK and 
agricultural sector bankruptcies (England and Wales) fell to 0.504, suggests that over those years 
the level of bankruptcies in the UK economy was not as good a leading indicator of financial stress 
in agriculture as it had been in the 1980s. 
 
Data for agricultural sector insolvencies are available up to 2008, but unfortunately they are 
incomplete for both 2006 and 2007.11  The number of agricultural insolvencies and bankruptcies 
increased from 202 in 2002 to 230 in 2005, this is a similar number to 1986 but at 0.4% it is a lower 
proportion of total bankruptcies and insolvencies in England and Wales.  Total agricultural 
bankruptcies for the next year in which they are available, 2008, had fallen below the 1986 level, at 
172, suggesting a lowering of financial pressure.  However, although data for 2006 and 2007 is 
                                                 
10 Harrison and Tranter (1994, p. 16) attribute the increase in agricultural insolvencies in the late 1980s to the 
“delay by the farming industry to adapt to its greatly diminished profitability – the cost of growing 
indebtedness”. 
11 A major reclassification of businesses resulted in records for separate sectors not being made for three 
quarters, 2006 Q4, and 2007 Q1 and Q2: 147 agricultural bankruptcies and insolvencies were recorded for the 
first three quarters of 2006, and 89 in the final two quarters of 2007. 
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incomplete, there is some evidence that 2008 represented an increase over both previous years, 
indicating a rising trend that may suggest future financial difficulties. 
 
Between 2005 and 2008 the total number of insolvencies and bankruptcies in England and Wales 
increased from 62,184 to 122,079 (provisional).  The lower proportion of agricultural insolvencies and 
bankruptcies (0.4%) suggests that the underlying causes of bankruptcy in agriculture had 
substantially decoupled from the reasons pertaining in the wider economy.  Hudson (1986) 
identified three theoretical causes of bankruptcy is a useful place from which to further analysis the 
conditions in place in the agricultural sector at the start of the financial turmoil.  These are listed 
below and discussed in turn. 
 Negative equity, when liabilities are greater than assets the business is technically bankrupt; 
 Inadequate cash flow, which can result in creditors petitioning for bankruptcy to secure the 
repayment of outstanding loans, or landlords terminating tenancies where rental payments 
have not been met; 
 Uncertain expected profitability. 
 
The data presented above suggests that UK agriculture has benefited from rising asset prices at a 
time when many businesses and individuals have been exposed to negative equity as the 
commercial and domestic property markets collapsed.  This has seriously unbalanced many 
businesses‟ balance sheets at a time when agriculture‟s balance sheet was benefiting from strong 
growth in asset prices.  Figure 2 shows that UK farming has substantial positive equity, so negative 
equity is therefore unlikely to be a major driver of any increase in the sector‟s bankruptcy in the 
near future.12  But all businesses have been affected by banks reducing their lending, which has put 
pressure on their cash flows.  The evidence presented above suggests that cash flow management 
is the biggest single problem in the UK agricultural sector at present.   
 
The credit crisis has also made debt held on short-term bank overdrafts vulnerable to foreclosure.  
Figure 8 shows the short-term liabilities (bank overdraft) current asset ratio to be 60%, less than the 
72% reported in 1986 and the 80% reported in 1991.  Although this ratio is higher than in the 1970s, 
UK agriculture has more that its historically accepted level of short-term loan cover should banks 
foreclose on loans due to their need to ration credit. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
12 This analysis addresses the agricultural sector as a whole; the absence of a detailed farm-based study 
means the distribution of equity between farm businesses is not considered. 
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Figure 8.  Debt and asset structure ratio (short term liabilities as a % of current assets, and current 
assets as a percentage of fixed assets). 
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Source: Various tables from Agriculture in the UK (DEFRA, 2009b) 
 
 
Figure 8 also shows current assets to be about 6% of total assets, compared to nearly 17% in 1986.  
This ratio has been affected by surge in farmland prices in recent years.  This surge brings into 
question the relationship between farmland prices and their intrinsic value.  An asset bubble occurs 
when there is trade in high volumes and at prices that are considerably at variance with intrinsic 
values.  The aim of speculators is to hold an asset whose value will increase, so as to make a profit 
on their transaction, this continues as long as there is an adequate supply of buyers of that asset.  A 
common pre-condition for an asset bubble to exist is easy access to cheap loans, exactly the 
circumstances in the UK economy in the 2000s.  Is there then is a danger that years of easy access 
to cheap loans may have generated a bubble in the farmland market?  The preponderance of 
farmer purchasers of farm land would suggest that farmland has been purchased for its value as a 
business asset, and has therefore, been valued according to expectations about farm profitability 
and is therefore formed in part on the recent high commodity prices. 
 
This can be examined by inspecting Figure 9.  It shows the most recent cycles in farmland value, 
measured as annual change in real farmland prices (£/ha), and the annual change in real Total 
Income from Farming (TIFF), measured in £ billions.  As the majority of farmland purchasers are 
working farmers, farmland‟s intrinsic value is best calculated as the present value of the expected 
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future profitability of farming.13  It shows four periods of growth in land price, 1971-3, 1977-9; 1988 
and 1994-7, each followed by years of negative growth as the markets readjusted their 
expectation.  For example, farmland prices grew between 1993 and 1997, followed several years of 
high TIFF, but fell in 1998, following a substantial drop in TIFF.  This sort of linkage provides some 
confidence of a link between farmland prices and farming profitability, which suggests the growth 
in the preceding years was based on agricultural values, and so did not represent an asset price 
bubble. 
 
The recent increase in land values between 2003 and 2007 also followed several years of increased 
TIFF, with the slower growth in 2006 reflecting drop in farming profitability.  This suggests that 
farmland values over this period have also remained linked to farmers‟ expectations of the 
profitability of farming.  Therefore, any future fall in TIFF would be expected to be reflected in a 
reduced rate of growth, or fall in farmland values.  However, a recent analysis of commodity 
markets (UNCTAD, 2009, p. 53-84) suggests the extreme scale of recent changes in primary 
commodity prices (the price boom between 2002 and mid 2008 was followed by a decline across 
all major categories of commodities) was largely driven by a major new element in commodity 
trading over the past few years, namely financial investors treating commodities as an asset class.  
The speculative activities of financial investors that are active in both financial and commodity 
markets appear to have influenced price movements to higher or lower levels that those dictated 
by market fundamentals.14  If this is the case, then whilst farmland values may be based on 
expectations of the profitability of farming, because expectations are in turn based upon a bubble 
in commodity prices, farmland may be overvalued. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
13 Traditionally the intrinsic value of land has been considered the expected agricultural net rent.  But this is 
related to the profitability of farming through time lags dictated by agricultural tenancy legislation.  As most 
land is purchased by owner-occupiers, its net value to the farmer is directly related to the expected increase 
in profitability to the purchaser.  So Total Income from Farming (TIFF) is a suitable measure of its expected 
intrinsic value to the sector. 
14 “The fact that these market participants do not trade on the basis of fundamental supply and demand 
relationships, and that they hold, on average, very large positions in commodity markets, implies that they can 
exert considerable influence on commodity price developments” (UNCTAD, 2009,  p. 54). 
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Figure 9. The annual percentage change in real farmland price and real Total Income from 
Farming. 
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Sources: Table 4.3 Agricultural Land Prices, Agriculture in the UK and Chart 2.1 Long-term trends in 
farming income in real terms (at 2008 prices); United Kingdom (various, DEFRA, 2009b) 
 
It is the interconnections between markets that make differentiating between an asset bubble, a 
bull market and a boom difficult - and often conclusive identification is only possible in retrospect 
when a sudden drop in prices appears and the market crashes, and the more speculative gains 
are quickly wiped out. 
 
The evidence would suggest that UK farming is in a much healthier position than it was in the 1980s 
and early 1990s.  However, the recent changes caused by the credit crisis are not likely to be been 
fully reflected in the data presented above, most of which in only available up to 2007.  Therefore 
the following sector examines some of the implications of these changes on the UK agricultural 
sector as the crisis unwinds and governments seek to balance their budgets in the UK and across 
the globe. 
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Current Finance-related Sources of Risk in UK Agriculture 
 
The evidence suggests therefore that UK agriculture is much better structured to cope with the 
credit crunch and economic downturn that it would have been in 1986.  However, some risks are 
largely unforeseeable and generally beyond an individual farmer‟s control, such as the animal 
disease epidemics which have increased production risk.  Other risks can be forecast and 
appraised, such as the recent proposals to ban selected pesticides (which may have similar 
consequences for arable sector) (Rickard 2008). 
 
Agricultural production has also been strongly influenced by the incentives created by agricultural 
policy.  In 1986, oversupply and full intervention stores created guaranteed markets and 
predictable incomes, which removed some incentives for farms to diversify into new farm activities 
and to develop non-traditional farm enterprises.  However, the revisions to support payments in 
2005 mean that many of the market-led support incentives have largely changed and be 
redirected to farmers as direct payments related to the land they farm.  And of course, the macro-
economic environment in which farms operate, as outlined in the introduction, have also changed.  
This section examines future sources of finance-related risk to UK agriculture given these changed 
circumstances. 
 
Profitability and cash flow: the ability to payback interest and principle 
The importance of the debt-to-asset ratio (Figure 2) is clear as it is used in the context of evaluating 
insolvency.  However, Penson (1987), analysing US agriculture, noted that farmers‟ ability to service 
their farm debt was deteriorating long before the debt-to-asset ratio began to rise in the 1980s.  He 
concluded that when used by itself this ratio is a “poor indicator of farm cash flow problems before 
they become insolvency problems” (p 15).  He suggests three ratios to use to predict exposure to 
increased leverage: 
 Times Interest Earned ratio (TIE), dividing total earnings before interest and tax (TIFF plus net 
interest plus rent paid) by total (net) interest payments; 
 Financial Leverage Index (FLI), dividing the rate of return on equity capital by the rate of return 
on total capital; and 
 Debt Burden Ratio (DBR), dividing net cash farm income by total farm debt. 
 
These indices are shown for UK agriculture from 1973 to 2007 in Figure 10.  The TIE ratio has fallen 
from nearly 8 to less than 5 suggests interest payments have risen as a proportion of farm sector 
profit.  The fall in the FLI shows that returns to agricultural assets have fallen in comparison with the 
costs of borrowing.  DBR has also fallen in most years since 2001 (the 2005 value is an anomaly 
affected by delays in making the first Single Payment Scheme payment), showing the reduced 
ability of the sector to service its interest payments. 
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Figure 10.  Trends in leverage and other financial ratios 
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Source: calculated from various tables reported in Agriculture in the UK (DEFRA 2009b) 
 
Whilst UK agriculture has substantial equity, the three debt-service ratios in Figure 9 indicate a 
growing weakness in its ability to service borrowing from farm profits and cash flow.  Though the 
current Bank of England interest rate is low, these rates have not been entirely passed on to 
commercial loans as banks seek to recapitalise their balance sheets.  These indices therefore 
suggest reasons for concern if pay-back becomes even more problematic and for DBR and FLI at 
least, approach long-term lows.  In the event that banks call in more of their short-term loans or 
interest rates rise (to help the recapitalisation process or to reduce expectations of inflation), 
farmers may need to sell assets to repay loans and principal, which would most likely reduce the 
growth in farmland prices. 
 
Agriculture sector policy risk 
Figure 11 shows the evolution in the dependency of the agriculture sector on government support 
payments.  The substantial decrease in proportion of agricultural commodities and increase in the 
proportion of subsidy payments after 1992 is explained by MacSharry‟s reforms, and the shift in 1996 
by the BSE crisis.  In 2005, the switch to decoupled support payments (the Fischler‟s reforms) moved 
the bulk of this support into transparent Single Payment Scheme payments (Franks, 2006).  In 1986 
direct support payments represented only some 4% of the total value of farm produce, by 2007-8 it 
was in excess of 15% (down from its peak of 21% in 2005).  The recent fall is largely a result of the 
global commodity price boom, and the proportion of support payments to total output is likely to 
increase when market prices return to their pre-boom long-run average. 
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The Single Payment Scheme (SPS) in England sets out future support payments, in Euros, up to 2012.  
This helps cash flow planning and so reduces financial risk.  But the sterling value of these payments 
depends on exchange rates and level of modulation, both of which are subject to short-term 
changes.  In addition, farmers face end-of-programme uncertainties, in this case revisions to the 
CAP in 2013.  The mid-term CAP health check in 2008 altered the rules relating to modulation.  This is 
a mechanism whereby the EU and Member States can transfer payments from Pillar 1 (guarantee 
expenditure and single farm payment) to Pillar 2 (rural development and agri-environment 
schemes).  In 2009, compulsory and voluntary (Member State) modulation of farmers in England 
was 19%, and for amounts over €300,000/farm, 23%.  Most of the modulated money (over 80%) is 
retained by the Member State.  It may be attractive, therefore, for governments to use this 
mechanism to reduce support payments received by farmer without changing the headline level 
of SPS payments.  This threat, however, is reduced by the current obligation on Member States to 
co-finance modulated money thus drawing additional resources from national treasuries.  But these 
co-financing mechanisms were amended slightly in 2008 and could be substantially revised in 2013. 
 
The SPS has increased dependency compared to 1986, but importantly also introduced a new type 
of risk to agriculture because of their transparency payments made to each farm business can be 
recorded (FarmSubsidy.org 2009).  This allows policy makers to question the notion that all farm 
businesses require support, and makes arguments for capping and reducing payments to individual 
farms stronger and administratively possible.  Moreover, the recent switch in DEFRA‟s preferred 
measure of on-farm profitability, from Net Farm Income to Farm Business Income, also makes it 
easier to target support payments to households with incomes below some agreed level (Franks 
2009a). 
 
Exposure to macro-economic policy: exchange rate risk15 
Direct payments and commodity support prices are set in Euros (before 1st Jan 1999 in ECUs), so 
payments in sterling depend partly on the exchange rate, and partly on agricultural policies, such 
as agri-monetary compensation, modulation and financial discipline.  Figure 12 shows the trends in 
sterling exchange rate against the Euro and US dollar.  After several years of largely stable and 
slightly rising exchange rates, sterling steadily depreciated against the Euro for two years from mid 
2007, thus increasing the value of SPS payments - a 5% shift in the £/Euro is reckoned to change UK  
                                                 
15 Exchange rate risk was not identified by Harrison and Tranter as a growing source of risk to UK agriculture.  In 
the mid 1980s the agri-monetary system set the sterling value of European commodity support prices, which at 
that time were denominated in European Units of Account.  The mechanism for setting the green rate 
changed between 1973 and 1992, in 1986 the green rate was the central market rate times the switchover 
coefficient.  The switchover coefficient changed whenever the spread in monetary compensatory amounts 
(MCAs) between the strongest and weakest member state‟s currency exceeded 5 points.  The overall effect 
of this complicated mechanism was to insulate UK agriculture from adverse exchange rate movements in 
sterling, and to allow it to benefit from revaluations in other member state currencies.  The reduction in 
commodity support prices, and the complete removal of the agri-monetary system, means that UK farming is 
now more exposed to variations in exchange rates than in 1986 (Ritson and Swinbank,1997). 
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Figure 11.  Total subsidies paid to agriculture as a percentage of value of agricultural output (at 
market prices). (Total subsidies (less taxes) on product are payments linked to the production of 
agricultural products. “Other subsidies on production” include payments not linked to production 
from which agricultural producers can benefit as a consequence of engaging in agricultural 
activities e.g. Single Payment Scheme, agri-environment schemes) 
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Source: Table 9.3 Aggregate balance sheets for agriculture; (United Kingdom) Agriculture in the UK 
(DEFRA, 2009b) 
 
total income from farming by £0.3 billion or 15% (Working Group on Risk Management 2003: p 4).  
Figure 13 illustrates the impact of variations in exchange rates.  It shows the difference in direct 
payments payable to UK farmers given the strongest and weakest sterling:Euro exchange rate 
between 1995 and 2008 to be 23.25 p/Euro.16 
                                                 
16 The actual payments received depend on other factors, such as agri-monetary compensation 
and modulation, which introduces an element of sector specific policy risk alongside exchange 
rate risk. 
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Figure 12.  Exposure to macro-economic policy: exchange rate risk (Euro/£) 
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Source: Exchange rates taken from Bank of England website (Bank of England, 2009) 
 
Credit rationing for trading partners (counterparty risk) 
A key reason why liquidity dried up shortly after Lehman Brothers was allowed to go bankrupt in 
September 2008 was that banks did not know how solvent their customers (which included other 
banks) were.  This risk is termed counterparty risk – the danger of the other party in the financial 
transaction may go bust.  Rather than risk lending, banks rationed credit; called in debts and 
reduced overdraft facilities as they attempted to recapitalise their balance sheets.  The extent to 
which this has happened to UK farm businesses is not known but the increase in lending suggests 
that the sector as a whole has not been subject to credit rationing.  However, farm businesses, like 
all businesses, face increased counterparty risk, and therefore need to tighten their credit control, 
and review trading arrangements.  The example of the withdrawal of bank funding for the failed 
farmer owned dairy co-operative, Dairy Farmers of Britain which went bankrupt on 3 June 2009 
owing their farmer members an estimated £92 million  (DIN, 2009, p. 9), shows the potential losses 
that can arise from counterparty risk (Pricewaterhouse Coopers, 2009). 
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Figure 13.  Annual exchange rate used to convert arable area payments and single payment 
scheme payments from ECU/Euros to sterling (1995-2008: values for 1999, 2001, and between 2005 
and 2008 estimated) 
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Future threats: protectionism 
In the immediate aftermath of September 2008 financial crisis, G20 leaders met in Washington and 
pledged that they would not lead the world into a new era of protectionism.  However, the full 
impact of the many and varied government responses, many of which have been unconventional, 
are not known, and unemployment is likely to continue to rise, and politicians find pressure to 
protect jobs difficult to resist.  A report produced by Global Trade Alert (Evenett, 2009) believes it 
likely some of these measures will either intentionally or unintentionally discriminate against trade 
partners: their investigation of 172 state initiatives introduced by G20 nations since June 2009 found 
that “121 were found to tilt the playing-field against foreign commercial interests.  Only 23 of the 
121 discriminatory measures related to the imposition of duties following anti-dumping actions, 
countervailing duties, and safeguards investigations, implying that resort to other means to close 
borders has been widespread.  These findings imply that, on average, a G20 member has broken 
the no-protectionism pledge every three days” (Evenett, 2009, p. 3).  The research found that a 
large majority of these discriminatory measures are in smokestack (low productivity manufacturing), 
declining industries and agriculture (Evenett, 2009, p. 18 and their Table 2.8 (p 24)).  The effect of a 
raft of protectionist measures is difficult to estimate, but such a reaction is identified with the 
worsening of the Great Depression in the 1930s, a period that saw many bankruptcies in farm 
businesses in the UK. 
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 Economic recession: impacts on farm diversification activities 
Harrison and Tranter (1989, p. 22) acknowledged the importance of the increase in income arising 
from on-farm diversification activities, but a lack of information prevented them including an 
assessment of this as a source of risk and adjustment strategy in their report.  A report on 
diversification published in the same year as the Harrison and Tranter report, by McInerney and 
Turner (1989), reporting the findings of a survey of 10,000 holdings in England and Wales, found that 
“over 40% had at least one non-farming enterprise, with an estimated one third of all holdings in the 
UK having diversified in some way” (p. i).  However, the general scale of operation was “fairly low”, 
with “nearly two thirds of enterprises producing less than £5,000 output and one quarter less than 
£1,000”.  One driver of diversification was insecure farm incomes; “as incomes from farming have 
seemed less secure many operators of agricultural holdings have been looking to see whether any 
of the [diversified enterprises] were relevant to their businesses.  As a result there has been a 
noticeable expansion in farm diversification in Britain in the last decade” (McInerney and Turner, 
1989, p. 58).  A later study undertaken by CRR (2003, p. 155) arrived at a similar conclusion, whilst 
noting that the scale and extent of these activities had grown, as agriculture continued to adjust to 
new opportunities afforded by the developing rural economy.  That study concluded that 58% of 
holdings engaged in some form of diversified activity. 
 
Definitions of farm diversification have changed over time (Ilbery et al., 2006; Caron and Cairol, 
2008), as have sampling frameworks and survey methods, so comparisons between studies are not 
strictly valid. However, DEFRA has produced a consistently defined time series of diversified 
activities based on the Farm Business Survey (DEFRA, various)17 which reported that 51% of farm 
businesses18 had some form of diversified activity in 2007/08, a similar percentage to that reported 
each year since 2003/04.  In 2007/08 this activity generated some £400 million of income, 15% of 
farm aggregate income in that year.19 
 
This level of resource deployment out of the farming sector directly exposes agriculture to new risks.  
The majority of this income was generated through letting buildings for non-farm use (39%), whilst 
other important sources of income include processing/retailing of farm produce (7%), sport and 
recreation (8%), and tourism (3%).  Activities such as these have high income elasticity of demand, 
and this makes them exposed to any economic downturn.  Not all diversification activities are 
                                                 
17 The definition used by DEFRA, unlike that used by McInerney and Turner, excludes the provision of 
agricultural services as a diversification activity. 
18 Larger than one half of a Standard Labour Requirement, the size that indicates a full-time or part-time farm 
business. 
19 But there is a wide variation between farms: for 36% of businesses with diversified activities, diversified 
income accounted for a quarter or more of the total farm income, and for 22% of businesses, the estimated 
income from diversification exceeded the income from the rest of the farm business (DEFRA, 2009d, p. 6).  
Other studies have shown the importance of diversified income to different farming sectors (Franks, 2009b). 
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successful; they involve financial risk as investments are made into new markets to service uncertain 
markets, but the likelihood of success remains a little studied subject (McInerney and Turner 1989). 
 
Economic recession: impact on off-farm income 
Consistent data is now becoming available about farmer and spouse off-farm employment.  In 
2003/04 about 24% of farmers (or their spouse‟s) in England earned off-farm income of, on average, 
£14,200 (compared to the average income from farming of £17,200).  The proportion had 
increased to 32% in 2007/08 (DEFRA, 2009d).  With data on diversification activities and off-farm 
income becoming available it has now become possible to research (i) the impact of the wider 
economy on diversified and off-farm income, (ii) the degree of risk-balancing undertaken by 
farmers, that is the extent to which lower risk from a more reliable income streams permit more risk 
taking in other income-earning enterprises, and (iii) the fungibility of different sources of farm 
household income. 
 
Fiscal adjustment: tax increases for the agricultural sector 
This analysis has shown agriculture‟s conservative attitude to credit, and for this reason it is more 
likely to be less affected by the credit crunch than other sectors.  Does this make it a target for a 
combination of tax increases and spending cuts?  Agriculture could be targeted for tax increases, 
for example it may see a reduction in the sector‟s tax allowances, such as the loss of fuel-tax relive 
on red diesel or the loss of VAT zero rating status for food, or the introduction of new taxes, such as 
a farmland property tax.  Removal the zero rate on food might raise £11.95 billion (Adam and 
Browne 2009).  A farmland property tax could be introduced along the lines applied in the USA, 
where farmland is valued on its agricultural use value which is multiplied by a combined county 
and state property tax rate to raises some $4.9 billion annually (USDA ERS, 2009).  This might have 
the additional appeal of expanding the local tax base and so supplement the council tax, the only 
significant local tax left in the UK (Adam and Browne, 2009). 
 
Summary 
The sector‟s leverage is appears low because of the boom in farmland prices.  These prices appear 
reasonable given the boom in commodity prices.  However, there is some evidence that 
commodity prices have been influenced by trading arrangements that are based on holding 
commodities as assets, rather than their underlying supply and demand relationships.  If this is so, 
then it is likely farmland is currently over-valued and as such exposing many who hold land as 
collateral to a risk of a fall in asset values. 
 
Moreover, the measures of payback considered above have all moved against the sector, which 
suggests that returns to farm assets, and cash flow, are failing to keep up with the cost of borrowing 
and interest charges.  And agriculture remains as heavily dependent on government support 
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payments as it has for many years, and as these have now become transparently traceable to 
individual farms, it is now administratively possible to target support payments to support farm 
incomes according to non-agricultural criteria, such as low-income households.  
 
Whilst this analysis has identified aspects of UK farming‟s financial structure that may offer cause for 
concern in the near future, there is little doubt that it entered the turmoil in a strong position.  It has 
reduced its exposure to many of the financial risks identified by Harrison and Tranter in 1986.  But is 
possible that the strength of the sector will make agriculture a target for a combination of loss of tax 
breaks, increases in taxation and/or reduced support payments as government attempts to reduce 
its budgetary deficit and public sector debt? 
 
This section has identified seven sources of risk for UK agriculture as it seeks to make its living over 
the next 10 years or so.  The additional exposure of farming to the macro-economy, through policy 
reforms, diversification, the credit crisis and the recession, has introduced new risks to UK farming.  
However, it is worth noting there are many other risks, and types of risk.  For example, failure to 
comply with cross-compliance regulations, or to the terms of agri-environment agreements, the 
proposed withdrawal of some crop and livestock protection agents from 2009 (which may reduce 
yield and increase yield variability (Health and Safely Executive, 2009; Rickard, 2008)), and changes 
in the structure of supply chains which continue to drive down farm margins - and as margins fall 
any remaining income variability becomes more important. 
 
In addition, farmers are being collectively asked to take on more responsibility in the management 
of farm animal diseases and to finance a high proportion of any costs associated with their 
eradication (DEFRA, 2009c), thus increasing their costs whist the effectiveness of the new 
mechanisms is unknown.  Other types of risk have always been with farming, for example the 
fatality rate.  In 2007/08 construction and agriculture had the highest rates of fatal injuries; 
agriculture and horticulture reported 39 fatalities in 2007, and 487 major accidents in 2006, the last 
year for which data for this series is currently available.  In addition to the financial risks considered 
in this paper, farmers are exposed to the personal and family risks common to any business, and this 
often has knock-on consequences for farm prosperity and survival. 
 
Managing risk at the farm level 
How can an assessment such as this help farmers?  It is true that many of these trends are outside 
the scope of individual farmers influence.  But assuming farmers‟ main objectives are to remain in 
business and to increase wealth over time, then what remains true is farmers need to 
(i) get the big decisions right and 
(ii) have sufficient short-term flexibility to cope with different circumstances.  
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Getting the big decisions right (e.g. land purchase, machinery investment) is critical (Pannel et al. 
2000; Just 2003).  Pannel et al., (2000) cite papers to support the statement that the farmers “most 
likely to be under acute financial strain at any time are those who brought land or machinery at 
the wrong time or at the wrong price or who made significant and incorrect major adjustments to 
their farm operations” (p. 72).  Big decisions carry additional importance as they can lead to higher 
losses, and timing is as always key.  However, this area receives less attention from researchers than 
it deserves.  But short-term adjustment to farm management are also important as these can make 
a substantial impact to farm profitability.  Tactical adjustment – doing the unusual - are more often 
observed in extreme years, both good and bad when optimal management practices may be 
very different to most years.  Doing better than average, especially when many other farmers are 
having difficulty, has important consequences for farm growth and development.  However, 
retaining flexibility requires access to options and retaining surplus capacity, for example, 
maintaining a wider range of cultivation equipment than is normally used, increases farm costs.  So 
identifying the optimum surplus capacity to retain becomes a balance between certain costs and 
unknown benefits.  A problem that grows more difficult to manage when a farm is under increasing 
financial stress. 
 
Conclusions 
 
Harrison and Tranter‟s 1989 analysis identified seven growing sources of risk.  Many of the financial 
trends their conclusions were based on continued to deteriorate into the early 1990s before farmers 
put into operation the processes of adjustment – leading to the shedding of costs and control of 
debt.  Some farmers, principally the heavily indebted, were forced out as part of this readjustment, 
as shown by the level of insolvencies in the agricultural sector which reached 500.  It is salutary to 
be reminded of this history as the UK economy enters the third year of the credit crunch and the 
second year of a recession.  But unlike the late 1980s and early 1990s, the agricultural sector is 
much more soundly based financially.  It has benefited from two years of high commodity prices 
which has reversed the adverse long-term movement in product prices relative to factor prices, 
and from a devalued pound.  Farmers have used this period of relative prosperity to replace worn-
out equipment and some will have replaced short-term bank overdrafts with more secure longer-
term loans. 
 
Despite increasing total liability, the sector‟s leverage has fallen below 6% and net equity increased 
to £178.9 billion in 2008.  Farm asset values have remained buoyant notwithstanding the slump in 
the housing property market, showing a 59% increase in the price of farmland in the 5 years 
between 2002 and 2007, with prices continuing to rise through to the first half of 2009.  But one 
consequence of the increase in debt and reduced cash flow leading up to 2007 has been a 
reduction in the Debt Burden Ratio and gradual increases to interest rates, from 5.6 in 2003 to 7.6 in 
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2007 have caused the Financial Leverage Index to fall.  However, neither DBR or FLI are out of line 
with historic trends.  The increase in interest payments, rising by 46.4% between 2003 and 2008, 
resulted in the Times Interest Earned ratio falling to the lower end of its long-term trend, indicating 
some cause for concern as commercial interest rates can be expected to remain high into the 
foreseeable future as banks seek to further shore-up their balance sheets.  And the credit crunch is 
a source of further concern in the form of counterparty risk, as less well financially structured 
businesses struggle and banks foreclose, forcing then into bankruptcy or insolvency.  The example 
of Dairy Farmers of Britain, whose bankruptcy appears to have cost dairy farmer members some 
£92 million is a poignant lesson as total insolvencies in England and Wales exceeded 120,000 in 2006 
and 2007, years prior to the seizing up of liquidity in September 2008 and subsequent economic 
downturn. 
 
Another potential risk is posed by the cumulative effect of changes to agricultural support 
mechanisms, particularly the increase in transparency of payments and likely revisions in 2013.  The 
cumulative effect of regular, largely piecemeal and incremental reforms introduced since 1986 
have radically changed support payments and mechanisms, and this has affected the risks 
involved in farming.  Decoupling support from commodities and coupling it to the area farmed 
reduces exposure of total revenues to price and yield risks.  However these benefits are off-set to 
some extent by (i) a reduction in commodity price support which increases output price risk, (ii) the 
increased difficulties of predicting future prices and profitability now markets are increasingly 
globalised and currently attracting interest from financial institutions, (iii) exchange rate risk as only 
the Euro level of Single Payments made to each farm are known up to 2012, and (iv) the Single 
Payments are subject to reduction either through modulation and perhaps financial discipline.  
Whilst decoupling support may reduce commodity prices, it will benefit some farm sectors, for 
example, lower cereal prices reduce animal feed costs.  As some of these impacts will bring benefit 
to some sectors, the evidence relating to the net effect of decoupling on risk is not clear cut. 
 
Above all, UK agriculture is now exposed to global price movements.  And the globalisation of the 
financial markets exposes farming to the financial implications of the large public sector debt.  
Relatively strong sectors, such as agriculture, which have transparent support mechanisms, may be 
easy targets for a combination of cuts to public sector payments and higher taxes.  In 2009, trends 
in global financial and commodity markets, and the future constraints imposed by the UK‟s macro-
economic policy now appear the most important sources of risk to UK agriculture. 
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